Relatore: prof. Giuseppe mosconi introduzione



Scaricare 0.78 Mb.
Pagina14/18
14.11.2018
Dimensione del file0.78 Mb.
1   ...   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18

142 A questo proposito è illuminante riportare le conclusioni tratte da Kitty Calavita nel suo “Inside the State”: “With the bracero solution to illegal immigration dismantled, not only did employers return to using illegal labor, but the flow was redoubled. The contract labor system had strengthened the historical dependence of western growers on Mexican labor. And so the dialectical sequence of contradictions and conflicts plays on, as the solution of one period prepares the way for the conflicts of the next”.

143 In questo senso sia la proposta del Presidente Bush, sia il bill del Senato sembrano riconoscere questo nesso fondamentale anche se sarà poi questione di come verrà riorganizzato il sistema di sanzione per gli employers inadempienti. Non dobbiamo dimenticare che le pressioni delle corporations e del grande business, possono inibire l’azione delle agenzie di controllo e rendere vana ogni previsione. La riuscita di un programma di lavoro temporaneo è inoltre collegata all’effettività ed alla celerità dell’apparato burocratico che verrà creato per gestire l’assegnazione dei permessi di lavoro e le assunzioni. Se questo apparato si dimostrerà farraginoso, non riuscirà a dare vita ad un sistema veramente alternativo all’assunzione informale di immigrati senza documenti.

144 La proposta di Bush non include espressamente questa eventualità e viene posta grande fiducia sul fatto che i guest workers alla fine del contratto di lavoro temporaneo ritorneranno nel proprio paese d’origine. Nel S. 2611, viene invece previsto un path to citizenship, che si strutturerà su diversi steps, distribuiti in un arco temporale che può raggiungere i dieci anni, per consentire a tutti gli immigrati che lo desiderano di ottenere la residenza permanente negli Stati Uniti ed eventualmente la cittadinanza.

145 Nel quarto capitolo tratterò approfonditamente dell’approccio “Prevention Through Deterrence”, incentrato su misure di border build-up e militarizzazione del confine.

146 Nel quinto capitolo di questa tesi, come ho già accennato nel primo capitolo, mi occuperò dell’Attrition Theory Approach, partendo dall’analisi di Prposition 187, che si proponeva di negare i servizi fondamentali come l’assistenza sanitaria e l’educazione primaria agli immigrati clandestini, per costringerli ad auto-deportarsi, abbandonando gli Stati Uniti.

147 Su questo punto mi trovo d’accordo con la posizione sostenuta da Mark Krikorian nel suo saggio intitolato “Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guest Worker Programs”, reperibile sul website www.cis.org. “The distiguishing feature of a guestworker program is that the guests are expected to return home rather than settle permanently. This is an attempt to make the importation of people operate more like the importation of goods, such that only the product of their labor stays behind”.

148 Nel saggio “Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guest Worker Programs”, Mark Kirkorian critica la convinzione di Bush che i lavoratori temporanei torneranno in patria attratti da incentivi economici che permettano loro di iniziare una nuova vita e migliorare le proprie condizioni. Che ruolo avranno questi incentivi considerato il fatto che le aspettative di un guest worker dopo un periodo di lavoro di sei anni, possono cambiare completamente e spingerlo a considerare la possibilità di continuare la propria vita negli Stati Uniti?

149 “This program expects temporary workers to return permanently to their home countries after their period of work in the United States has expired”, estratto dal discorso tenuto da Bush il 7 Gennaio 2004 di fronte al Congresso. E’ chiara l’intenzione di precludere la creazione di nuovi canali per la regloarizzazione dello status dei guest workers, da aggiungere alle vie legali già esistenti.

150 Il “path to citizenship”, che nelle intenzioni dei promotori del Senate bill non sarà un’amnistia ma una “earned legalization” è la previsione più duramente criticata dai conservatori. Essi sostengono che si tratti di un’amnistia, cioè un perdono incondizionato per tutti coloro che hanno infranto la legge, entrando e permanendo illegalmente negli Stati Uniti. Nel terzo capitolo, dedicato all’IRCA, analizzerò questa disposizione, e le critiche ad essa connesse, più approfonditamente.

151 Dal saggio di Mark Kirkorian “Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guest Worker Programs”: “The General Accounting Office reported that the backlog of pending immigration applications of various kinds was 6.2 million at the end of FY 2003, up 59 percent from the brginning”.

152 “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors; Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration”, Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J.Malone, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2002.

153 Dall’Inglese “scapegoat” ossia “capro espiatorio”.

154 In un discorso al Congresso tenuto l’8 Giugno 1982, Ronal Reagan così si espresse: “If history teaches anything, it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly. We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma--predictions of doomsday, antinuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil? Fonte, www.ronaldreagan.com.

155 “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors; Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration”, Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J.Malone, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2002. La paura della minaccia rappresentata dalla Russia, con il suo arsenale nucleare, venne usata per costruire l’ideological framerwork in cui inserire ogni iniziativa sia di politica estera che di politica interna durante tutti gli anni Ottanta. In un modo molto simile, dopo l’11 Settembre, la lotta contro il terrorismo internazionale, “War on Terror”, sta avendo la stessa funzione ed è stata utilizzata dal Presidente Bush come giustificazione per l’entrata in guerra prima in Afghanistan ed ora in Iraq.

156 “Learning from IRCA: Lessons for Comprehensive Immigration Reform”, Jimmy Gomez, Walter E. Ewing, Volume 5, Issue 4, May 2006, Immigration Policy Center, www.migrationinformation.org.

157“I RCA represented a three-pronged approach to undocumented immigration: legalization of most undocumented immigrants currently in the United States; creation of a new

system of employee verification and employer sanctions to make it more difficult for undocumented immigrants to find jobs; and enhanced border enforcement to reduce the flow of

undocumented immigrants into the country. However, the primary provisions of IRCA were those related to employee verification and employer sanctions. The authors of the bill, Representative Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky and Senator Alan Simpson of Wisconsin, as well as leading immigration experts, believed that the only way to effectively reduce undocumented immigration was to curtail the ability of undocumented immigrants to find employment”. Estratto dal saggio “Learning from IRCA: lessons for comprehensive immigration reform”, Jimmy Gomez and Walter A. Ewing, Immigration Policy Center, Volume 5, Issue 4, May 2006, www.migrationinformation.org.


158 Ibidem.

159 Employer sanctions were intended to limit the demand for undocumented workers by imposing fines on employers who did not verify a person’s eligibility to work in the United States; continued to employ persons not authorized to work in the country; or knowingly hired undocumented immigrants”. Dal saggio “Learning from IRCA: lessons for comprehensive immigration reform”, Jimmy Gomez and Walter A. Ewing.

160 “The employment eligibility of each worker will have to be verified by the employer, using an INS-specified form, the I-9.Where the JTPA program serves as the employer, as is the case for many summer youth and work experience programs, the JTPA program would have to verify employment eligibility. Employers determined to have failed to comply with the employment verification requirements may be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each individual for whom such a violation occurred. Employers who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens may be subject to a fine of up to $2,000 for the first violation and up to $10,000 for subsequent violations”. Dal website ufficiale del Dipratimento del Lavoro Americano, “DINAP bulletin”, no. 87-07, www.doleta.gov.

161 “Report on the Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments ACT of 1986”, Report 99-682, July 16, 1986, p. 46.

162 Ibidem, p. 49.

163 “A major provision of this Act will permit the legalization of aliens who were in the U.S. illegally prior to January 1, 1982. In addition, alien farmworkers who performed seasonal agricultural services for at least 90 days in the 12-month period ending May 1, 1986 may apply for U.S. residency. Dal website ufficiale del Dipartimento del Lavoro Americano, “DINAP bulletin”, no. 87-07, www.doleta.gov.

164 “Under a separate Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program in IRCA, illegal aliens who have worked in the U.S. perishable crop agriculture for at least 90 days in the past year ending May 1986 could qualify for legal status. The required duration in the temporary resident alien category is shorter for those who have worked in U.S. seasonal agriculture for up to three years”. Estratto dall’articolo “Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control”, Barry R. Chiswick, Journal of Economic Perspective, Volume 2, Number 3, 1988, p. 109.

165 “Border enforcement, which today has become the primary means of controlling undocumented immigration, had a secondary role under IRCA. The House Judiciary Committee report did not provide guidance as to the strategic role of border enforcement, but simply stated that “the Committee has consistently supported increased resources for the Border Patrol to stem the massive illegal entry of aliens and this bill specifically authorizes additional enforcement funds for this purpose”. Dal saggio “Learning from IRCA: lessons for comprehensive immigration reform”, Jimmy Gomez and Walter A. Ewing.

166 Con “alien” ci si riferisce ad una persona che non è cittadino del paese in cui si trova e non ha con esso un rapporto di “political allegiance”; ci sono diverse definizioni di aliens correntemente usate per riferirsi alle differenze di status legale: legal aliens, resident aliens, illegal alien, enemy alien, www.wikipedia.com.

167 “To address the fear that employers would overreact to the threat of sanctions and discriminate against individuals who sounded or appeared foreign, Congress also passed IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions..[..]..Employers with four or more employees are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of citizenship status..[..]..The antidiscrimination provisions also prohibit small employers (e.g., those with four to fourteen employees) from committing national origin discrimination against any U.S. citizen or individual with employment authorization”. Estratto da un documento ufficiale pubblicato sul website del Dipartimento dell’Agricoltura Americano, “IRCA antidiscrimination provisions”, United States Department of Agricolture, www.usda.gov.

168 “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors”, Massey, Durand, Malone, p. 89.

169 The former Immigration & Naturalization Service, Department of Homeland Security have not made employer sanctions a priority”. Estratto dal documento Lack of Worksite Enforcement

and Employer Sanctions” Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, June 21, 2005, www.judiciary.house.gov.

170 Un estratto dal “Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination”, GAO/GGD-90-62, March 29, 1990, riportate in “Learning from IRCA: Lessons for Comprehensive Immigration Reform”, Jimmy Gomez, Walter E. Ewing, Immigration Policy Center, www.migrationinformation.org, p.3, fa luce su questo punto: “The reports found that the sheer number of documents which employees could use to verify their identity and authorization to work (29 at the time) created confusion for employers and provided ample opportunity for fraud. Furthermore, many employers faced the dilemma of either blindly accepting documents submitted by would-be employees or turning them away and potentially discriminating against lawful workers. To comply with the anti-discrimination component of IRCA and avoid potential discrimination lawsuits, employers started to assume that most, if not all, documents submitted by workers were authentic. The relatively small number of employers who intended to subvert the law understood that as long as they properly filed the required Employment Eligibility Verification

(I-9) forms for their workers, it would be difficult for the INS to prove that they had “knowingly” hired or continued to employ undocumented workers.”



171 Nonostante la grande enfasi posta nell’IRCA sulle employer sanctions e sulla legalizzazione, il border enforcement ricevette la maggior percentuale di risorse finanziarie: il 57% (70.5 milioni di dollari) dei fondi supplementary per l’implementazione dell’IRCA nell’anno fiscale (FY) 1987 vennero stanziati per il border enforcement, contro un misero 27% per le sanzioni ai datori di lavoro e un 14% per la deportazione degli immigrati clandestini. Il budget dell’INS crebbe considerevolmente dopo l’IRCA, di circa il 90%; anche il personale tra il 1986 e il 1990 fu aumentato del 40%, arrivando a 11,000 agenti. From Horseback to High-Tech: US Border Enforcement”, Deborah Waller Meyers, Migration Policy Institute, February 1, 2006, www.migrationinformation.org.

172 Si veda il primo capitolo dedicato al Bracero Program.

173 “The Other Americans, How Immigrants Renew Our Country, Our Economy, And Our Values”, Joel Millman, Penguin Book, 1997.

174 Abbiamo già visto nel capitolo precedente come i lavoratori stranieri durante il Bracero Program divennero un elemento strutturale nel settore agricolo americano. Essi di fatto, costituivano una underclass sfruttata, usata per abbassare gli standard di vita e i salari di tutti i lavoratori impiegati nelle grandi coltivazioni. La presenza degli undocumented nell’economia statunitense ha il medesimo effetto che i braceros ebbero durante gli anni di implementazione del programma. Da qui l’esigenza di regolarizzarne lo status per prevenirne lo sfruttamento. La mancanza della volontà di mettere in atto misure di worksite enforcement efficaci, minò alla base questo proposito, in quanto i datori di lavoro non furono dissuasi dall’assunzione di manodopera clandestina.

175 Una persona legalizzata secondo l’amnistia poteva compilare una “petition form” per un parente desideroso di legalizzare il proprio status ed entrare negli Stati Uniti come lavoratore. Questo procedimento permise a moltissime famiglie di potersi riunire in quanto “protette” dalle “family preference rules”, previsioni che favorivano il ricongiungimento familiare dei “nuovi legalizzati”.

176 “Learning from IRCA: Lessons for Comprehensive Immigration Reform”, Jimmy Gomez, Walter A. Ewing, Immigration Policy Center, Volume 5, Issue 4, May 2006, www.migrationpolicy.org.

177 “Immigration and International Relations: Proceedings of a Conference on the International Effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Program for Research on Immigration Policy, Gorge Vernez, The RAND Corporation and The Urban Institute, 1990, p. 29.

178 “The SAW and RAW programs were added to IRCA to enable the legislation to attract sufficient support among farmer to assure passage. To further protect the growers, enforcement of immigration law on farms and ranch was made more difficult”. “Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control”, Barry R. Chiswick, Journal of Economic Perspective, Volume 2, Number 3, 1988, p. 109. Anche il programma di lavoro temporaneo attualmente discusso in Congresso, è appoggiato da potenti lobbies economiche, per le quali il cheap labor migrante è vitale.

179 Sostenitori dell’importanza dell’IRCA nel plasmare la situazione attuale dell’immigration system, in combinazione con gli effetti del NAFTA, di cui ho parlato nell’introduzione, sono Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand e Nolan J. Malone nel libro seminale “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Changing Economy”. Gli autori in questo libro affermano come politiche economiche e dell’immigrazione implementate in passato continuino a fare sentire i propri effetti e in particolare l’IRCA, può essere visto come l’origine di molti dei trend che caratterizzano l’immigrazione clandestina oggi giorno.

180 “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors”, chapter 5, p. 73

181 “Beyond Smoke and Mirrors”, chapter 5, p. 83

182 In the United States, the contradiction between unrealistically restrictive immigration policies and the realities of a transnational economic system is most extreme in the case of Mexico (although there are other examples, particularly among the nations of Central America). The U.S. economy has grown increasingly reliant on the labor of Mexican workers in an increasingly diverse range of industries for more than a century. The two nations have actively pursued economic integration over the past 20 years to the point that Mexico is now the second largest trading partner of the United States. Yet, paradoxically, the U.S. government has attempted to swim against the tide of its own economic policies by trying to impose arbitrary numerical limits on Mexican immigration since the mid-1960s. The rise of undocumented migration has been the predictable result”. Questo estratto dall’articolo intitolato “From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating Immigration to the United States”, Walter A. Ewing, Immigration Policy in Focus, Volume 3, Issue 5, November 2004, www.aifl.org, illustra con grande precisione questo processo, che ha radici profonde nella storia delle relazione tra Messico e Stati Uniti.


183 IRCA made it illegal for employers knowingly to hire unauthorized aliens. Background IRCA requires employers to comply with an employment verification process intended to provide employers with a means to avoid hiring unauthorized aliens. The process requires newly hired employees to present documentation establishing their identity and eligibility to work. Employees have the choice of presenting 1 document establishing both identity and eligibility to work (e.g., an INS permanent resident card) or 1document establishing identity (e.g., a driver's license) and 1 establishing eligibility to work (e.g., a Social Security card) from a list of 27 acceptable documents. Generally, employers cannot require employees to present a specific document. Employers are to review the document or documents that an employee presents and complete an Employment Eligibility Form, INS Form I-9. On the form, employers are to certify that they have reviewed the documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual. Employers are expected to judge whether the documents are obviously fraudulent. INS is responsible for checking employer compliance with IRCA's verification requirements”. Estratto dal documento intitolato “Illegal Aliens: Fraudulent Documents Undermining the Effectiveness of the Eployment Verification System”, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, GAO, July 17, 1999.

184 It should always be illegal for a U.S. employer ‘‘knowingly’’ to hire an unauthorized alien. There was a clear consensus on this point in 1986, and that consensus remains today. A crucial corollary to this policy, however, is that U.S. employers should be allowed to actually ‘‘know’’ when they might be ‘‘knowingly’’ hiring an illegal alien. In other words, the burden of a more secure worker verification system should be placed squarely on the federal government, and not on U.S. employers. This requirement turned out to be the Achilles Heal of IRCA, and it was subsequently thoroughly mismanaged by succeeding Administrations of both parties”. Così il senatore Alan Simpson si esprime nel suo prepared statement durante un’udienza alla House of Represenative. “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”, Hearing Before The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 1, 2006.

185 La grandissima disponibilità di lavori low.skilled è uno dei principali pull factor che attirano ogni anno centinaia di migliaia di migranti verso gli Stati Uniti. Questo processo è ulteriormente stimolato dalla completa mancanza di ogni forma di controllo nei luoghi di lavoro, per cui gli employers sono di fatto liberi di assumere grandi quantità di lavoratori senza documenti.

186 Si veda il paragrafo dedicato a questo argomento intitolato “La creazione dell’esigenza strutturale di manodopera a basso costo nell’agricoltura: l’immigrazione clandestina durante il Bracero Program”.

187 “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”, Hearing Before The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 1, 2006; Prepared Statement of the Honorable Alan K. Simpson, former U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming, p. 10.
1   ...   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18


©astratto.info 2017
invia messaggio

    Pagina principale