Relatore: prof. Giuseppe mosconi introduzione



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189 “Is the Reid-Kennedy Bill a Repeat of the Failed Amnesty of 1986?”, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representative, one hundred ninth Congress, second session, September 1, 2006, U.S. Government printing office, www.judiciary.house.gov.

190 Ibidem.

191 Lo statement ufficiale di questo ente governativo recita: “[The Social Security Administration is an organism]..to advance the economic security of the nation's people through compassionate and vigilant leadership in shaping and managing America's Social Security programs”. Per maggiori informazione si veda il website ufficiale www.ssa.gov.

192 The SAW program was a political compromise that was made necessary in order to enact the legislation. (Don’t we Congresspersons all remember that ritual?!) In order to satisfy employer interests who were seeking a large pool of unskilled labor, the terms of the program were overly generous (a mere 90 days of ‘‘labor in agriculture’’ qualified an unauthorized alien for the SAW program)”. “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”, Hearing Before The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 1, 2006; Prepared Statement of the Honorable Alan K. Simpson, former U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming.


193 “In order to satisfy organized labor and immigrants’ rights organizations, the status provided to the ‘‘guestworkers’’ had to be permanent (reportedly to avoid employer exploitation), not temporary. As a result, over 1.3 million people obtained permanent residence under the SAW program, and the vast majority of them then promptly exited agricultural labor” , “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”.

194 Questo è un punto controverso in quanto uno degli argomenti del dibattito per l’inclusione di un nuovo programma di lavoro temporaneo nella riforma dell’immigration system riguarda la mobilità del guestworker nel mercato del lavoro. Se si concepisce un simile programma come un mezzo per sopperire alla carenza di manodopera in determinati settori, sarebbe bene legare il lavoratore ad un employer o almeno ad un settore d’impiego specifico. Ciò potrebbe avere però delle conseguenze negative se si dovessero verificare violazioni dei diritti del guestworker, che si troverebbe nell’ impossibilità di cambiare lavoro e cercare condizioni migliori.

195 At this time, the 1986 Senate version of legalization should be adopted. The 1986 Senate bill stated that no legalization program was to take effect until an independent commission had determined, and reported to the President, that effective enforcement measures had been implemented that were reasonably likely to deter illegal immigration in the future. The House insisted that this provision be deleted in conference in 1986, and it was”. “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”.



196 I believe there is some political merit to a ‘‘triggered amnesty”. “Is The Reid-Kennedy Bill A Repeat Of The Failed Amnesty Of 1986?”. Il senatore Alan Simpson è uno tra i sostenitori di questa visione. Subordinare l’attivazione di un provvedimento di amnistia solo in presenza di garanzie che l’enforcement andrà ad agire in modo organico e complementare con esso.

197 U.S. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (D): è una delle personalità di spicco nel dibattito sulla riforma dell’immigration system e uno degli autori del Senate bill. Questo un estratto dal website ufficiale, www.reid.senate.gov: “I supported S. 2611, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, which the Senate passed with a strong bipartisan vote in the 109th Congress. Unfortunately, the leadership of the House of Representatives refused to work with the Senate to reconcile the differences in our two bills, so we were unable to enact reform last year”.

U.S Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachussets (D): da più di quarant’anni membro del Senato, campione dei civil rights e da sempre uno dei maggiori sostenitori di una riforma delle politiche dell’immigrazione come si evince da questo breve statement tratto dal website ufficiale, www.kennedy.senate.gov: “From our country’s very beginning to the present day, immigrants have helped build our nation, and made us strong. Their labor is vital to the economy, and it will continue to be needed to sustain our economic growth. The American people demanded action on this critical issue, and the Senate answered with a bipartisan solution to the problem. Business and labor, Republicans and Democrats, and religious leaders strongly supported our bipartisan plan to strengthen our borders, provide a path to earned citizenship for workers who are here illegally, and put in place a realistic guest worker program for the future”.



198 Congressman James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin (R): campione della anti-immigration advocacy possiamo intuire la sua posizione fortemente conservatrice solamente esaminando le issues elencate nel website ufficiale a lui dedicato. Sebbene egli sia stato uno degli ideatori del bill H.R. 4437, non vi è presente la voce immigration: solamente entrando nella sezione dedicata alla Homeland Security, possiamo trovare informazioni sulla sua agenda in merito alla riforma dell’immigration system.

199 Il Senator Alan Simpson così si espresse durante i lavoro per l’approvazione dell’IRCA: ‘‘I firmly believe that a one-time-only legalization program is not only good public policy, it is good sense, and it is fully in the best interest of this country.’’ “Should We Embrace the Senate’s Grant of Amnesty to Millions of Illegal Aliens and Repeat the Mistakes of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986?”, Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, House Immigration Subcommitte Hearing, House of Representatives, one hundred ninth Congress, second session, July 18, 2006, www.judiciary.house.gov.

200 Ricorrendo molto spesso a cifre arrotondate in eccesso, gli oppositori del “Comprehensive Reform Bill”, affermano inoltre che, data la presenza di un numero di illegals compreso tra i 12 e i 20 milioni, il potenziale migrante se si dovesse garantire l’amnistia sarebbe di oltre 67 milioni. Questa osservazione è stata fatta riprendendo l’effetto catalizzatore per l’immigrazione clandestina che ebbe l’amnistia del 1986, subito confrontata dal problema dei ricongiungimenti familiari per i nuovi legalizzati.

201 Definizione contenuta nell’American Heritage Dictionary.

202 “The Senate plan is very much like the last amnesty passed as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed by Congress in 1986. Any legislation that does not require those who break the law to abide by it, but instead suspends the normal penalty and in some way changes the law to accommodate the violator is an amnesty. An amnesty in the immigration system is any change that allows people who would otherwise be subject to deportation to stay in the country. The idea that S. 2611 is not amnesty because it does not give permanent residence to illegals immediately is silly. Normally, illegal aliens would be subject to deportation. If 2611 becomes law perhaps 10 million illegal immigrants would be allowed to stay and work in the United States, which is de facto permanent residence and then after a few years would get actual permanent residence and then citizenship”. Questa l’opinione contenuta nell’intervento di Steve A. Camarota, direttore del Center for Immigration Studies durante l’udienza di fronte alla House of Representatives, House Immigration Subcommitte, July 18, 2006, www.judiciary.house.gov.

203 The Senate bill does not have any provisions that would forget or overlook immigration law violations”. “Should We Embrace the Senate’s Grant of Amnesty to Millions of Illegal Aliens and Repeat the Mistakes of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986?”, Statement of Sheila Jackson Lee, House Immigration Subcommitte Hearing, House of Representatives, one hundred ninth Congress, second session, July 18, 2006, www.judiciary.house.gov.

204 Questa posizione coincide peraltro con quella del Presidente Bush che ha più volte enfatizzato come una earned legalization non sia comparabile ad un’amnistia ed è rinforzata dalle parole di Carlos Gutierrez, Secretary of Commerce, che così si espresse di fronte al Senato nel Luglio 2006:

Amnesty, by definition, i san automatic pardon, or free pass, granted to a group of individuals without requiring any actions in return. IRCA was an amnesty-immigrants only had to prove their presence in the United States before a certain date to qualify for permanent residence. In contrast, the Senate Bill requires immigrants to earn legal status. They must qualify and pay over 3,000$ in fines to enter into the program, and then they must earn legal status by continuing to work for 6 years, learn English, pay taxes, and meet additional requirements before becoming eligible for a green card. Even after jumping through all these hoops, undocumented immigrants who qualify for a green card still don’t cut in front of anyone in the line. None of the current undocumented will be eligible for green cards until all of those already waiting are processed through the system”.



205 “S. 2611 has a three-pronged strategy to fix our broken immigration system that would avoid the mistakes of IRCA”. “Should We Embrace the Senate’s Grant of Amnesty to Millions of Illegal Aliens and Repeat the Mistakes of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986?”, Statement of Sheila Jackson Lee, House Immigration Subcommitte Hearing, House of Representatives, one hundred ninth Congress, second session, July 18, 2006, www.judiciary.house.gov

206 Ibidem.

207 “The Senate bill also repeats a key mistake of having the amnesty come before enforcement is actuallyimplemented. In the Senate plan, the amnesty is in no way connected to or contingent upon enforcement. If this approach is allowed, it seems almost certain that like the 1986 amnesty, illegals will get their legal status, but the relatively weak enforcement provisions in the Senate bill will be implemented slowly if at all”. Intervento di Steve A. Camarota, House of Representatives, House Immigration Subcommitte, July 18, 2006, www.judiciary.house.gov.

208 Per maggiori informazioni su questo documento importantissimo per l’employment eligibility si veda il sito ad esso dedicato, www.formi9.com.

209 To establish eligibility and identity: U.S. Passport; permanent resident card; or other documents designated by DHS. To establish employment eligibility: Social Security card; or other documents designated by DHS. To establish identity: a driver’s license or identity card that is REAL ID compliant; a driver’s license or identity card that is not REAL ID compliant, if it is not required by DHS to comply, contains photograph or other information including the name, date of birth, gender and address; IDs issued by a federal agency including the military, an agency or entity of a State, or a Native American tribal document, provided it includes photo or name/DOB/gender/ eye 13 color and address, and contains security features to make the card resistant to tampering, counterfeiting, and fraudulent use”. Fonte “ Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006”, Summary by National Conference of State Legislature, www.ncsl.org.

210 “Civil penalties for hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens: $500 - $4,000 per unauthorized alien; up to $20,000 for repeat violations (a repeat violation is defined as a violation that occurred 1-2 years before the current violation). Penalties for violating recordkeeping or verification: $200-$2000 for each violation up to $6,000 for repeat violations. DHS may not use its discretion to reduce penalties. Criminal penalties for pattern or practice: up to $20,000 for each unauthorized alien and up to 6 months imprisonment. Repeat violators can be barred from federal contracts or grants for 5 years. The employer compliance provisions do not preempt state and local laws requiring”. Fonte “ Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006”, Summary by National Conference of State Legislature, www.ncsl.org.

211 Electronic Employment Verification System (EEVS): DHS and Social Security will implement a system for employers to verify identity and work authorization. Individuals will be able to check their status in the electronic verification system in order to ensure the information is correct or has been properly updated”. Fonte “ Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006”, Summary by National Conference of State Legislature, www.ncsl.org.


212 Questa critica che trovo di un realismo ammirevole proviene nientemeno che dal chairman del Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, che in un’intervista tenuta assieme al Commerci Secretary, Carlos Gutierrez, di fronte alla direzione editoriale di USA Today, ha affermato: “Republican conservatives working to block an immigration bill risk endorsing a "silent amnesty" by insisting on deportations that are not going to happen. You're not going to replace 12 million people who are doing the work they're currently doing. If they don't leave, then you are going to give them silent amnesty. You're either going to let them stay or you're going to be hypocritical”.

213 Le critiche principali che essi muovono alla legalizzazione dei 12 milioni di immigrati illegali negli Stati Uniti derivano dall’assunto base che questa disposizione non farà altro che aumentare il flusso di clandestini, come avvenne dopo l’amnistia concessa nel 1986. Questo un elenco degli argomenti usati dagli anti-immigration advocates: si avranno gli stessi risultati dell’IRCA; è un insulto a tutti quegli immigrati che hanno rispettato la legge; l’amnistia verrà messa in atto in mancanza di misure efficaci di enforcement; le frodi e l’uso di documenti falsi aumenteranno; sarà economicamente insostenibile; sarà un pericolo per la sicurezza nazionale; creerà forti squilibri nel mercato del lavoro; sarà operosissima per i taxpayers; non è ciò che gli elettori vuole e quindi in contrasto con la volontà popolare. Queste affermazioni, sostenute con abbondanza di dati e ricerche empiriche, non riescono a configurare un’alternativa che non sia il mero border enforcement e la repressione, tramite la negazione dei servizi di base, degli immigrati. 12 milioni di persone, illegalmente presenti negli Stati Uniti è una cifra da capogiro; solo un provvedimento di legalizzazione, che sia chiaro, non rappresenta la soluzione al problema dell’immigrazione, riuscirà a migliorarne le condizioni di vita, portandoli allo scoperto e garantendo loro dei meccanismi di difesa contro lo sfruttamento.

214 “Efforts to police the flow of illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border have undergone a metamorphosis since the early 1990s: immigration control along the border has been elevated from on of the most neglected areas of federal law enforcement to one of the most politically popular. The unprecedented expansion of border policing, I argue, has ultimately been less about achieving the stated instrumental goal of deterring illegal border crossers and more about politically recrafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority”. Questa la posizione di Peter Andreas, sostenuta nel libro “Border Games, Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2000, p. 85.

215 “Prevention through deterrence, the strategy aimed to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border in key sectors in order to avoid having to deport them later”. “Holding the Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration”, Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, Richard Van Swearingen. Public Policy Institute of California. 2002.

216 “Although IRCA provided a temporary sedative, the law exacerbated the very problem it purported to remedy. Rather than discouraging illegal immigration, the main impact of legalization under IRCA was to reinforce and expand already well-established cross border migration networks”, Peter Andreas, dal libro “Border Games, Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide”, p.86. E’ opinione comune che l’IRCA abbia aiutato a creare le condizioni politiche che hanno portato al backlash contro l’immigrazione clandestina durante gli anni Novanta, di fatto stimolando le entrate illegali.

217 “Evaluating Enhanced US Border Enforcement”, Wayne Cornelius, May 1, 2004, www.migrationinformation.org.

218 “Although border control was a low priority for President Bill Clinton when he first took office in 1993 (indeed in 1993 he recommended to reduce the number of Border Patrol agents to save money) he soon became an enthusiastic proponent of stricter enforcement in order to keep up with Republican initiatives in Congress. The build-up of policing along the southwest border quickly emerged as the centrepiece of the administration’s immigration control policy”. Questo estratto dal saggio intitolato “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era”, Peter Andreas, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 114, No. 4, www.jstor.org, mette in luce come Clinton abbia cambiato il suo approccio nei confronti dell’immigrazione in conseguenza al clima di terrore per l’invasione migrante che caratterizzò quegli anni.

219 Il nuovo approccio avrebbe dovuto essere “preventivo”, per evitare che le forze dell’ordine dovessero accollarsi l’onere di arrestare ed espellere tutti gli immigrati senza documenti, caricando di extra-lavoro l’apparato di polizia. “The objective of increased fencing, surveillance equipment, penalties and law enforcement personnel is to inhibit illegal entry and thus avoid having to apprehend entrants after they’ve crossed the border”, Peter Andreas, dal libro “Border Games, Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide”, p. 92.

220 “By 1993 and 1994, three law enforcement operations to guard the border were set up. One was Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, Texas; a second was Operation Safeguard in Arizona; and a third was Operation Gatekeeper in California. These three operations were military-style operations with new hi-tech gadgets and added patrolmen and vehicles”. Estratto dal libro “The Three U.S. Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security”, Tony Payan, Preger Security Inernational, Westport, Connecticut, 2006.

221 “The rapidly expanding U.S. policy campaign on the Southwest border contrast sharply with the rhetoric and practice of U.S.-Mexican economic integration. The trend it seems, is toward increasingly restrictive controls over unauthorized immigrant labor flows in the cotext of a general loosening of controls over cross-border economic activity”. Dall’articolo “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era”, Peter Andreas, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 114, No. 4, www.jstor.org.

222 Come affermato nel libro “The Three U.S. Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security”, le operations, vedremo in seguito, non diedero vita ad una strategia volta a dare una soluzione di lungo termine all’immigrazione clandestina ma al contrario ebbero un’efficacia limitatissima nel tempo. Il loro ruolo fu principalmente quello di rinforzare la visione di un confine senza legge e completamente fuori dal controllo, per il quale era necessario adottare misure energiche volte in primo luogo a ridurne la porosità. “..it reinforced the view that the border was a lawless place where more law and order was required”, p. 13.

223 “Thus, the apparent paradox of U.S.-Mexico integration is that a barricaded border and a borderless economy are being created simultaneously”. “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era”, Peter Andreas. L’autore afferma inoltre che l’aumento delle politiche dedicate specificamente al controlli del confine, non abbiano a che fare con l’effettività della deterrenza ma con la gestione dell’immagine del confine.

224 Border Patrol Chief of El Paso.

225 “Beyond the Border Build-Up: Towards a New Approach to Mexico-U.S. Migration”, Douglas S. Massey, Immigration Policy Center, Volume 4, Issue 7, Washington D.C., Settembre 2005, www.immigrationpolicy.org. Per tutte le informazioni sulla Border Patrol, inclusi i periodici National Strategic Plans, si veda il website ufficiale www.cbp.org.

226 Inizialmente Silvestre Reyes fu osteggiato dai suoi superiori all’interno dell’Immigration and Naturalization Service poiché c’era la preoccupazione che una simile operazione deteriorasse le relazioni con il Messico. L’approccio Prevention Through Deterrence ben presto divenne la politica ufficiale appoggiata incondizionatamente da tutti gli esponenti conservatori e da allora raramente è stata messa seriamente in discussione. La dimostrazione di ciò sta nel fatto che il suo appeal ha toccato anche gli esponenti più liberal in entrambi gli schieramenti, nonché il pubblico americano, per il quale “securing the border” è una priorità indiscutibile.

227 “Evaluating Enhanced US Border Enforcement”, Wayne Cornelius, May 1, 2004. www.migrationinformatio.org. Queste zone sono chiamate “port of entry”, e coincidono con I maggiori centri urbani distribuiti lungo il confine. Obiettivo delle operations furono appunto città di confine come San Diego, El Paso e Nogales. Per un elenco dettagliato di tutte le port of entry sul confine con il Messico si veda il website, www.cbp.gov.

228 Ibidem.

229 Questo il titolo di un libro dello scrittore americano T.C. Boyle, che tratta della storia di du giovani coppie, una di immigrati clandestini, l’altra di cittadini americani della upper middle-class, le cui storie si intersecano sullo sfondo di una Los Angeles segnata della xenofobia, povertà e dal degrado ambientale. Il libro, pubblicato nel 1995, ebbe un grandissimo successo come possiamo apprendere da questo commento dell’autore: “My most controversial novel. Because it dealt with a hot-button socio-political issue -- illegal immigration in Southern California -- many of the reviewers came into the book with strong prejudices. I took a good deal of abuse, including (my favorite instance) being called "human garbage" on a call-in radio show in San Francisco. As people have had a chance to think about the book more deeply over the course of the past few years, the furor has died down and The Tortilla Curtain has become a modern classic, by far my most popular title, widely read in high schools and universities around the country”.



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